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Abstract
When will a public good or service be provided by the govern-
ment, when will it be provided by a NGO, and when will we see
a private-public partnership? This paper provides a model where a
typical public good requires different inputs which raises the possi-
bility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different
parties. But hold-up problems due to contractual incompleteness in
specifying tasks discourage separation of ownership and management.
The fact that public goods have the property of non-rivalry and non-
excludability and that NGOs tend to be non-profits drives our key
results. We apply the framework to NGOs in developing countries
which, in the last few decades, have been increasingly involved in var-
ious capacities in the provision of a wide range of public goods and
services.
∗This paper is a thoroughly revised and updated version of an earlier unpublished
working paper by us with the same title. We thank Eui Jung Lee for excellent research
assistance. We also thank the editor Federico Etro for encouraging us to revise the paper,
and his suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1 Introduction
The last few decades have witnessed a major shift in the relationship between
the state and the private sector in responsibility for delivering of goods and
services all over the world.1 The sharp expansion of the role of the state in
the spheres of welfare and development from the fifties to the seventies was
followed, perhaps inevitably, by increasing resource constraints and mount-
ing evidence of government failure. For example, the World Development
Report (2004) notes that while governments in developing countries spend,
on average, about a one-third of their budget on health and education, very
little reaches the poor because of leakage (due to administrative costs as well
as corruption). On top of this, there is rampant absenteeism and poor quality
service on the part of teachers and health workers.
There is now a decisive move away from the conventional view that
equated provision of public services with direct government provision. Several
organizational alternatives, such as public-private partnerships and contracting-
out, have been considered. There is also a growing acknowledgement of the
fact that there exists a large space between the market and the government
that is occupied by voluntary non-profit organizations (often called NGOs
in the context of developing countries) that play an important role in filling
up the vacuum created by the twin problems of government and market fail-
ure. NGOs have been supplementing and sometimes replacing government
agencies in the provision of relief and welfare, social services, and various
development projects in developing countries.
The increasing importance of NGOs is reflected both in their number, the
amount of development assistance that is channelled through them, and their
participation in various activities, ranging from consultation to involvement
in projects at the ground level, of major multilateral institutions like the
United Nations and the World Bank.
The number of international NGOs rose from less than 200 in 1909 to
nearly 1,000 in 1956 to over 20,000 in 2005 (Werker and Ahmed, 2008).
1See Besley and Ghatak (2007) and the World Develoment Report (2004).
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There has been a large increase in the number of domestic NGOs worldwide
as well. While definitive cross-country numbers are not easy to find, the
following facts indicate their substantial presence and increasing importance
in developing countries. According to the Department of Social Development
of South Africa (2015), an average of 68 new NGOs get registered every day,
with the total number of NGOs being 136,453 in 2015. The NGO sector in
Kenya represents more than 290,000 full-time employees, 2.1% of Kenya’s
economically active population (Maracci 2013). The case of India is really
striking, where over 3.1 million NGOs were registered in 2015.2 That is more
than double the number of schools in the country and amounts to one NGO
per 400 people.
We have also seen an increasing trend in recent decades of the involve-
ment of NGOs in the delivery of international development assistance. For
example, major donor countries in the OECD have allocated an increas-
ing fraction of their official development assistance to and through NGOs:
this dramatically rose from 0.7% in 1975 to 15.4% in 2013 (OECD, 2015).
Werker and Ahmed (2008) report that, excluding the substantial funds that
are channeled through NGOs to implement specific projects on behalf of
donor countries, the amount of discretionary funding that OECD countries
give to NGOs to promote international development assistance rose from very
low levels before 1980 to nearly $2 billion in 2004.
The growing influence of NGOs in the policy domain is also captured in
the rising numbers of NGOs in Consultative Status with the United Nations
Economic and Social Council - starting with none in 1945, by 2014 it had
grown to more than four thousand (Willets, 2015). It is also reflected in
the fact that the share of World Bank projects with some degree of ”civil-
society” involvement (that includes NGOs) increased from 6% in the late
1980s to over 70% in 2006 (Werker and Ahmed, 2008).
The growth of NGOs has been accompanied by the growth of an institu-
tional form called public-private partnerships (PPPs) which refers to working
arrangements between the state and any organization outside of the public
sector based on a mutual commitment for the provision of assets and de-
livery of services that have been traditionally provided by the public sector
over and above any explicit contractual arrangement such as contracting-out
to a for-profit firm (see Bovaird, 2004, and De Bettignies and Ross, 2004).
They key distinguishing feature is shared decision-making authority and a
2The Indian Express, August 1, 2015.
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shared dedication to achieve some kind of joint outcome (see De Bettig-
nies and Ross, 2004 and Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011). This contrasts
with either pure in-house public sector provision or a supplier or contractor
relationship in which the government dictates the terms of procuring or pro-
viding some particular service (e.g., related to infrastructure such as ports,
highways, electricity generation, telecommunication, and sanitation).
Despite these major changes in the policy arena, the academic literature
on public goods provision lags behind. There is relatively little attention to
the institutional structure and organizational design issues in public goods
delivery beyond the focus of standard public economics textbooks on variants
of the Lindahl-Samuelson rule. How does one think of an NGO from the
point of either public economics or organizational economics? How does one
formalize the concept of a public-private partnership?
The World Bank (1995) defines NGOs as private organizations driven by
humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives that pursue
activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the
environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community develop-
ment in developing countries. According to a United Nations body, NGOs
are characterized by six major characteristics: they are voluntary, non-profit,
service and development oriented, autonomous, have a high degree of moti-
vation and commitment, and some form of formal registration.3
They are therefore a subset of the nonprofit or voluntary sector. The
nonprofit or voluntary or social sector comprises of all private organizations
that provide some social service, usually in the fields of health, education,
and charity. They are active in developed countries too. These are typically
non-profits, which occupy a significant part of the private sector of modern
economies. A study of 26 countries conducted in the mid-1990s (Salamon
et al., 1999), for example, found that not-for-profits employed an average
6.8% of the non-agricultural workforce (12% in the case of the US). Another
study of eight OECD countries about a decade later (Salamon et al., 2007)
shows that not-for-profits contributed 8% to GDP on average (7.2% in the
case of the US). More recent figures suggest that employment in nonprofit
organizations accounted for 10.3% of total US private sector employment in
2012, up from 9.2% in 2007 (see Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). With the
rise of social enterprise and other forms of hybrid organizational forms that
3The United Nations Interagency Committee on Integrated Rural Development for Asia
and the Pacific (1992), pp. 34-35.
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lie between for-profit organizations and pure non-profits, the share of what
can be collectively called the private social sector is even larger.
A lot of the standard economic reasoning that underpins our understand-
ing of the allocation of resources in the private sector does not quite apply
in the social sector. To start with, quality and performance is typically non-
contractible, ranging from experience goods to credence goods. Also, many
of these goods and services have some externalities – that is, the benefits and
costs are partly external to the organization. Our economic understanding
of the social sector from the point of view of organizational economics and
incentive theory is limited, with most of the work being concentrated on the
non-profit sector in developed countries.4
At the same time, standard models of public goods provision, which has
as its premise that these goods and services have a public good component,
assumes that either the government or the charitable sector is able to provide
them. It is recognized that the provision may not be at an efficient level – ei-
ther due to political economy distortions in the case of government provision
or due to standard problems of free-riding in the case of private provision,
but until recently very little attention was paid to the microeconomic as-
pects of how organizations in the social sector operate, both in terms of the
inner-workings of these organizations (incentives, organization design issues
internal to the firm), as well as how these organizations interact and operate
at an industry level.
This paper provides a framework for understanding the spectrum of in-
stitutional forms with varying degrees of involvement of the government and
private non-profit actors in the provision of public goods. We draw on and
extend our earlier work on this topic (Besley and Ghatak, 2001).5 In that
paper we derived optimal ownership structure in the presence of public goods
properties in project returns. Here our focus is more applied and aimed at
understanding the rise of NGOs in developing countries in the provision of
various public goods as well as developing a framework to understand which
sectors they are more likely to be active in, and what variations we can expect
in their organizational form, in particular, in the degree to which they form
partnerships with various tiers of the government in developing countries. We
develop a simple and tractable version of the model presented in Besley and
4See Ghatak and Mueller (2007), Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), and Hansmann (1980).
5That paper in turn was a substantially revised version of an earlier unpublished work-
ing paper Besley and Ghatak (1999), that also appeared with minor changes as.Ghatak
(2005).
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Ghatak (2001) and discuss the implications of the theoretical framework to
understand the various forms of collaboration they have with the government
in these countries in a whole spectrum of relationships described broadly as
public-private partnerships.
There is a large literature on private procurement (see, for example, Laf-
font and Tirole (1996)) as well as a literature on contracting-out and public-
private partnerships (see, for example, Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
Hart (2003), Iossa and Martimort (2015), and Martimort and Pouyet (2008)).
However, the usual assumption in this literature is that private sector providers
are profit seeking. Also, the main trade-off they focus on is a variant of the
multi-tasking problem, namely the cost-quality trade-off. Iossa and Marti-
mort (2015) provide a nice overview of the literature on public-private part-
nerships. Once again, they focus on a multi-task environment and the key
trade-off they focus on is a cost-quality trade-off.
Our work is related to the literature on non-profits as reviewed, for ex-
ample, by Hansmann (1980) and Rose-Ackerman (1996). This has focused
on two main issues (i) how private provision by non-profit institutions can
supplement the provision of public goods by the government and (ii) how
the non-profit status of these institutions serves as a commitment device to
overcome informational and contractual problems. By considering a produc-
tion technology with multiple inputs, we add to this literature by providing a
framework which can explore the possible role of partnerships between non-
profits/government where the value that the respective parties put on the
service plays a key role.
The paper is also related to wider debates about how to generate state
capacity to deliver for citizens. This is now considered a central topic
in development (see, for example, Andrews, 2013 and Besley and Persson,
2011). The question of what investments and what institutional structures
are needed to deliver is now central to understanding why some countries
have been able to deliver basic services to their citizens effectively while oth-
ers have not. We contribute in a modest way to this by developing a specific
framework for thinking about one aspect of this.
The distinguishing feature of our framework is the assumption that much
private sector activity in public goods provision is value-driven and mission-
oriented. For example, non-profit organizations are typically motivated by
the desire to help the beneficiaries of public goods, who are often from the
poorest sections of society. We argue that this feature itself provides a direct
rationale for including non-profits in the analysis of the provision of public
6
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goods. By the logic of classical public economics, the valuation of any party
that values a public good should be taken into account in its allocation, and
by the logic of organizational economics, if organizations are mission-driven
and attract motivated agents, this should reduce agency problems. Indeed,
this paper relates to a recent literature that studies the role of intrinsic moti-
vation in solving agency and organization design problems (see, for example,
Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2017). In our model, there is no cost-quality
trade-off. Rather, we take a classic Grossman-Hart-Moore framework and
our main point of departure is emphasizing the public goods nature of some
of these projects, and the fact that the providers may well be driven by
pro-social motives. These two features drive the main results of this paper
regarding the division of ownership and management in the undertaking of
public projects.
Essentially what ownership provides is a commitment device for a caring
party not to free ride on the provision of the public good. This angle finds
support in the policy literature - for example, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff
(2011) argue that public-private partnerships are a way to overcome collective
action problems among stakeholders for certain types of public services and
development projects.
Our analysis starts with a benchmark model of the property rights litera-
ture pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) to
understand the ownership of an asset whose returns are private and appropri-
able. We retain two key elements from this literature. First, the value from
the service requires different kinds of investments, and different parties may
have comparative advantages that can be harnessed through a partnership.
Second, incomplete contracting leads to hold-up problems and ownership
affects incentives to undertake project-specific investments. What we then
proceed to add is the case where the returns from the project are non-rival
and non-excludable which is appropriate in the context of public goods and
services. We show that how much a party values the service plays an impor-
tant role in determining the optimal institutional arrangement, at par with
the relative importance of the respective inputs as well as the extent of the
hold-up problem depending on who is owner.
We then apply the insights from the theoretical analysis to understanding
the increasing importance of NGOs in developing countries in the provision
of various social welfare and development schemes. We attempt to relate
the implications of our theoretical framework to provide some structure to
a rich literature of case studies on NGOs and public-private partnerships
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highlighted by various field studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we lay out the model and analyze the main institutional alternatives that we
consider for provision of the public project. Section 3 applies the framework
to NGOs in developing countries. We discuss how well the model casts light
on the trend towards greater NGO involvement in that context. Section 4
concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Private Project
Based on the property-rights approach of Grossman-Hart-Moore, we propose
a simple model of ownership of an asset. There is a facility that generates
some service, say a school or a health care center. It can be run by the gov-
ernment or a private NGO on their own, or the two can form a partnership.
To clarify our terminology, any form of collaboration between the government
and the NGO will be referred to as a partnership, but the specific form of
the partnership can vary in terms of who has control rights over the project.
We will allow for a partnership with the government being the owner, the
NGO being the owner, or the two having joint-ownership. All these forms
will fall under the broad spectrum called public-private partnerships. The
formal version of these specific forms is presented below. We will also al-
low for autarchy, later in this subsection, where the government or the NGO
provide the service independently.
As a benchmark, we start with the case where the asset is used to provide
services whose returns are privately appropriable, that is, it has no externali-
ties. Following the GHM framework, an organizational form is characterized
by who owns the project (in the sense of ownership of all non-human assets
specific to the project), allowing for ownership by the government, the NGO,
or joint-ownership, to be precisely characterized below. We use a contracting
framework where at the beginning, the NGO and the government choose the
most efficient mode of contracting, in the sense of maximizing their ex ante
joint surplus. We allow side payments or transfers between the two parties
to facilitate this process.
As in the property rights approach, ownership of assets is important over
and above who manages the project or supplies other inputs because it give
8
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residual control rights to the owner. At the ex post stage where due to
incompleteness of contracts the parties may renegotiate any agreement that
they may have had earlier and ownership gives greater bargaining power at
this stage, which in turn improves the investment incentives of the owner,
while reducing them for the non-owner. We study alternative organizational
forms where the government can own the project and allows the NGO to
manage it, the NGO can own the project and allows the government to
provide some critical inputs, or they jointly own the project. As mentioned
earlier, later we compare these organizational forms (to be referred to as
partnerships) with pure government provision and pure NGO provision.
Suppose the value of the project depends on ex ante investments x and
y. We can think of x relating to inputs that are needed in time to run a
school or a health service well and y as relating to management and service
delivery. In particular, the value generated by the project is:
V (x, y) = A+ ax+ by
Even without any investments, the project generates some value (A). Invest-
ments enhance the value from the project. Let the costs of investment be,
respectively, c(x) = 1
2
x2 and c(y) = 1
2
y2. Let the two parties be indicated
by G and N , standing for the government and a NGO. We can think of the
investments corresponding to two tasks. For example, the government could
be providing assistance with infrastructure and the NGO could be providing
the delivery of the service.
We assume that G and N have comparative advantage in the investment
of x and y, respectively. As partnership between G and N enables both
parties to exploit their comparative advantages. We initially assume that
onlyG is able to invest in x, and likewise, onlyN invests in y. We will explore
the possibility of autarchy later in this subsection. In our formulation, the
payoff is additively separable in the investments. However, the tasks involved
in providing the service are likely to be complementary. We could add a term
φxy (with φ > 0) to the benefits generated from the investments. We omit
the details of this case to keep the analysis simple but qualitatively, the
conclusions are very similar.
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2.1.1 First Best
As a benchmark, we note that the first-best level of investments are given
by:
x∗ = a
y∗ = b.
The expected surplus is:
S∗ = A+
1
2
(a2 + b2).
2.1.2 Second-Best
Now assume that x and y are non-contractible, but V (x, y) is observable
ex post and the parties bargain over ex post surplus, as in the Grossman-
Hart-Moore framework. Suppose G is the owner and so can fire N at the
bargaining stage. Let 1 − λ be the fraction of the investment of N that
is embodied in his human capital and cannot be realized in the event of a
bargaining breakdown.
All through we use the notational convention that the organizational form
is indicated by the superscript and the individual party whose payoff is be-
ing referred to is indicated by the subscript. Therefore, under government
ownership, the outside options of G and N are
uGG = ax+ λby + A
uGN = 0.
With the standard assumption of Nash bargaining, and assuming equal
bargaining weights for the two parties, the ex post payoff of G from the
project is:
A+ ax+ by
2
+
uGG − uGN
2
= ax+
1
2
(1 + λ)by + A.
The corresponding ex post payoff of N is:
A+ ax+ by
2
+
uGN − uGG
2
=
1
2
(1− λ)by.
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Each party will choose the level of ex ante investments by maximizing
their ex ante payoffs which equals the above expressions and subtracting the
costs of x and y˙ from the relevant payoff. This yields the following values of
the investment levels:
xG = a
yG =
1
2
b(1− λ).
The total expected ex ante surplus is:
SG = A+
1
2
{a2 + b2δ(λ)}
where
δ(λ) ≡ (1− λ){1− 1
4
(1− λ)}.
Notice that δ(λ) is monotonically decreasing in λ, taking the highest value 3
4
when λ = 0 and the lowest value 0, when λ = 1. It captures the extra degree
of loss of investment incentives of N from hold-up due to having a bargaining
disadvantage, which in turn depends on the extent to which the fruits of the
investment is embodied in his human capital.
As we would expect, SG < S∗. The reason is, the investment incentives of
N are undermined by the hold-up problem even though under our formulation
the investment incentives of G are not affected and remains at the first-best
level. It can be verified that SG is decreasing in λ since the higher is λ, the
more is N at a bargaining disadvantage ex post as G can fire him and retain
most of the benefits of his investment.
Suppose N is owner and can fire G at the bargaining stage. Parallel to
λ, let µ be the fraction of the benefits of G’s investment that stays with the
project in the event of a bargaining breakdown and so the outside options
under N -ownership are:
uNG = 0
uNN = µax+ by + A.
We can repeat a similar exercise as above, with Nash bargaining giving the
following ex post payoffs from the value generated by the project to G and
11
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N are:
A+ ax+ by
2
+
uNG − uNN
2
=
1
2
(1− µ)ax
A+ ax+ by
2
+
uNN − uNG
2
=
1
2
(1 + µ)ax+ by + A.
Analogous to previous case, the investment levels will be determined by max-
imizing these anticipated ex post payoffs, taking into account the costs of the
investments:
xN =
1
2
a(1− µ)
yN = b
The total ex ante expected surplus will be
SN = A+
1
2
{a2δ(µ) + b2}
where δ(.) has been defined above.
As before, SN is always less than S∗ and it is decreasing in µ. Now, the
investment incentives of G are undermined by the hold-up problem but the
investment incentives of N are not affected and remains at the first-best level.
What this framework provides us is a set of parameters which determines
which form of ownership is better. By comparing SG and SN we get
Result 1 In the case of a project with no externalities, party i (i = G,N)
will more likely to be the owner: (i) the more important is the marginal
value of his investment in generating project value (determined by the relative
values of a and b), and in the extreme case where there is only one party whose
investment matters (a = 0 or b = 0), then that party should be owner; (ii)
the greater is the loss of surplus due to the hold-up problem when he is not
the owner (determined by the relative values of λ and µ).
This result is the same as that comes out of the standard GHM model (see
Hart, 1995 for a simple exposition) and the intuition is straightforward. If a
party’s investment is more important for generating value from the project
then to the extent the hold-up problem is symmetric, this party should be
owner. A simple corollary of this is, if one party’s investment is not im-
portant for the project then that party should not be owner, since he will
12
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not contribute anything of value and yet distort the investment incentives
of the other party. Similarly, if the investments are equally important, but
the hold-up problem is more severe when one party is owner, then the other
party should be owner. The extent of the hold-up problem depends on the
fraction of benefits of one party’s investment that is embodied in his human
capital and will be lost if he is not the owner and is no longer involved with
the project in case of a bargaining breakdown.
Finally, suppose the parties jointly own the project. What this means
is both parties have veto power and both need to agree if the project is to
go ahead. Referring this case to be that of joint-ownership (and using the
superscript J to indicate this organizational form), the outside options of G
and N are:
uJG = u
J
N = 0.
As a result, the investment levels will be:
xJ =
1
2
a
yJ =
1
2
b
The total expected surplus will be
SJ = A+
1
2
(
3
4
a2 +
3
4
b2
)
.
Notice that δ(0) = 3
4
and so this can also be written as
SJ = A+
1
2
δ(0)
(
a2 + b2
)
.
This is intuitive, since with join-ownership, in the event of a disagreement,
the results of the investments of either party is completely lost, so it is similar
to λ = 0 or µ = 0 in the case of single-ownership.
Comparing this with the expected surplus under G-ownership and N -
ownership, for joint ownership to dominate a partnership with one party
being the owner, the following condition needs to hold
δ(0)
(
a2 + b2
)
> max
{
a2 + b2δ(λ), a2δ(µ) + b2
}
.
13
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As we can see, if the hold-up problem is not severe under any form of single
ownership, then joint-ownership can never dominate single-ownership. For
example, if λ = 0 so that δ(λ) = 3
4
, we can see that G-ownership will dom-
inate joint ownership. However, if the hold-up problem is severe under both
forms of single-ownership (high values of λ and µ) then the investment in-
centives of the non-owner is badly affected in both cases, and joint-ownership
can emerge as a better alternative, assuming both investments are important
(i.e., the gap between a and b is not too large).
The following result summarizes our key conclusion as to when joint-
ownership is likely to emerge
Result 2 Public-private partnership can emerge as a preferred organiza-
tional form if the hold-up problem is severe under both G-ownership and
N-ownership (high values of λ and µ) and the gap between a and b is rela-
tively small.
Whenever λ is high, the hold-up problem is severe when G is the owner,
since a good fraction of the value generated by N ’s investment will stay with
the asset even if N leaves, putting N at a bargaining disadvantage. This in
turn reduces his incentives to invest. Analogously, when µ is high, the hold up
problem is severe whenN is the owner. If both λ and µ are high, ownership by
any single party will completely undermine the incentives of the other party
to invest. In contrast, joint ownership distorts incentives for both types of
investments but in a symmetric way. If the gap between a and b is large, say
a is relatively high, then G-ownership may dominate joint-ownership even if
the hold-up problem discouraging N ’s investment incentives is severe, since
joint-ownership hurts investment incentives of both parties. Joint-ownership
therefore emerges as a credible alternative when the gap between a and b
is relatively small and the hold-up problem is non-trivial under both pure
forms of ownership.
2.1.3 Autarchy
It is possible for either G or N to undertake both investments by themselves.
However, there would typically be a loss due the fact that the potential
benefits of comparative advantage are not utilized. But there is an advantage
in terms of not having to incur any inefficiencies due to hold-up problems. In
this section, we compare pure government provision and pure NGO provision
14
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with the three forms of collaboration between G and N that we looked at
in the previous section, namely, G-ownership (or partnerships with G having
authority), N -ownership (or partnerships withN having authority), and joint
ownership.
Suppose G undertakes both investments. Now the value of the project is
boosted by:
ax+ γGby
where γG < 1 which reflects the fact that there is some loss due to lack of
specialization if the government undertakes both types of investments.. The
costs of undertaking both investments are as before, namely, 1
2
x2 and 1
2
y2.
Even though we modeled the potential comparative advantage of NGOs as
being able to generate more value from their investment than the government
at the same cost as far as y is concerned, we could equivalently modelled it
as a cost advantage of the NGO or a cost disadvantage of the government.
For example, we could have assumed that under both form of autarchic
organizational forms, the value of the project is boosted by:
ax+ by
but the costs of undertaking both investments by the government are 1
2
x2
and 1
2
1
γG
y2.
Now G will solve:
max
{x,y}
ax+ γGby −
1
2
x2 − 1
2
y2
which yields the first-order conditions
x = a
y = γGb.
The expected social surplus is
SˆG = A+
1
2
(
a2 + γ2Gb
2
)
.
We use the notation SˆG to indicate it is pure government provision as opposed
to the expected surplus under an organizational form with G-ownership,
which we denoted by SG.
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Alternatively, suppose N undertakes both investments. Now the value
of the project is boosted by:
γNax+ by
where γN < 1 captures the loss of efficiency due to lack of specialization
similar to γG. There is no reason for the loss of efficiency due to lack of spe-
cialization being symmetric across the two investments and the two parties,
but we choose this formulation for notational simplicity. As in the previous
case, the costs of undertaking both investments are as before. Also, as in the
case of the government undertaking both investments, we could model the
potential comparative advantage of governments in investing in x relative to
the NGO as a cost advantage.
Now N will solve:
max
{x,y}
γNax+ by −
1
2
x2 − 1
2
y2
which yields the first-order conditions
x = γNa
y = b.
The expected social surplus is
SˆN = A+
1
2
(
γ2Na
2 + b2
)
.
Once again, we use the notation SˆN to indicate it is pure NGO provision as
opposed to NGO-ownership with involvement by the government.
A first-best partnership will obviously dominate both these autarchic
organizational forms. The main conclusion from comparing the expected
surplus under autarchic organizational forms to ones where G and N are
both involved but there is loss of surplus due to hold-up is:
Result 3 If γG and γN are small, then a second-best partnership, irrespective
of the form of ownership (G-ownership, N-ownership, and joint-ownership)
dominates pure provision by G or N . If either γG or γN is high, then pure
provision by G or N dominates a partnership.
This is a classic case of trade-off between the loss of efficiency from not
exploiting comparative advantage in the case of autarchy versus the negative
investment incentives due to the possibility of hold-up in the second-best
under G-ownership, N -ownership, and joint ownership.
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2.2 Public Project
Now we take the benchmark model of the previous section and modify it to
study the case where the benefits generated by the project are non-excludable
and non-rival as far as the two parties, G andN , are concerned. For simplicity
we assume that other than the fixed part of the project returns that are not
affected by investment (A), the remaining part of the project benefits (ax+
by) are now completely non-pecuniary, withG andN putting different welfare
weights on them. To give an example, if the relevant service being provided
is health care, in the case of privately appropriable returns, the providers get
more revenue if the quality of the service is improved due to more patients
visiting and there being some fees associated with the services which are
paid by the patients or their insurance provider. Now we view the quality
enhancements not translating into revenue, but still giving some satisfaction
to the parties involved in the provision because of their commitment to the
welfare of the patients, or to the mission of providing better health care. Of
course, in practice both elements are present and would call for an analysis
that allows for this. However, in this paper we will restrict ourselves to these
two polar cases of where the good or service is a purely private and when it
is purely public as far as the two parties, G and N , are concerned.
We assume that the government’s payoff includes the benefit to the direct
beneficiaries as well as the indirect payoff to other citizens who may care
about the public good or service in question. However, it does not include
the payoff of the NGO. Therefore, if we add the two up, we get total social
benefits from the project. The project benefits are non-rival as far as the two
parties are concerned, and in particular (this turns out to be a consequential
implication), they benefit from it whether or not they are directly involved
in the project or not.
Suppose G values the variable part of the project benefits by a multiplica-
tive factor θG and N by θN . Therefore, the value generated by the project
now is:
V (x, y) = A+ (θG + θN) (ax+ by) .
To make the comparison with the private returns case analyzed in the pre-
vious section easy, we will assume
θG + θN = 1.
This is not at all important to the results, and is somewhat restrictive, but
has the feature that the first-best outcomes under both these scenarios turn
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out to be identical as we will see below, and that makes comparisons under
the second-best very transparent.
First best levels of x and y are
x∗ = (θG + θN) a = a
y∗ = (θG + θN) b = b.
The first-best level of ex ante social surplus is
S∗ = A+
1
2
(θG + θN)
2 (a2 + b2) = A+
1
2
(a2 + b2).
Now consider the second-best. The key difference with the previous case is
that now a party can receive some payoff from the project even if he/she is no
longer directly involved (if bargaining breaks down). Consider G-ownership.
Now at the ex post bargaining stage G can fire N . The outside options are:
uGG = θG (ax+ λby) + A
uGN = θN (ax+ λby)
where λ is introduced in the same way as in the previous section.
With Nash bargaining, G gets the share:
A
2
+ (θG + θN)
ax+ by
2
+
uGG − uGN
2
= θGax+
1
2
{(1 + λ)θG + (1− λ)θN} by + A
The share of N is:
A
2
+ (θG + θN)
ax+ by
2
+
uGN − uGG
2
= θNax+
1
2
{(1− λ)θG + (1 + λ)θN} by.
Let
4 ≡ θG − θN
which can be positive, negative, or zero. Then the shares of G and N can be
written as
θGax+
1
2
(θG + θN + λ4) by
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and
θNax+
1
2
(θG + θN − λ4) by.
Ex ante investments by each party will maximize their payoff subject to
the costs of the investment, which are as before. It is straightforward to
derive the optimal investments:
x˜G = θGa
y˜G =
1
2
(θG + θN − λ4) b = 1
2
(1− λ4) b.
The expected total surplus is
S˜G = A+ (θG + θN)
(
ax˜G + by˜G
)− 1
2
(
x˜G
)2 − 1
2
(
y˜G
)2
= A+ a2θG
(
1− θG
2
)
+
1
2
b2δ (λ4) .
where δ(.) is as it was defined in the earlier section, namely, δ (λ4) = (1 −
λ4){1 − 1
4
(1 − λ4)}. Notice that if we set θG = 1 and θN = 0 then the
formula for S˜G collapses to the formula for SG, namely expected surplus
under G-ownership in the case of appropriable returns.
Under N -ownership, by a similar logic, the outside options are
uNG = θG (µax+ by)
uNN = θN (µax+ by) + A
where µ is defined as in the previous section.
The ex post share of G of the surplus is:
A
2
+ (θG + θN)
ax+ by
2
+
uNG − uNN
2
=
1
2
(θG + θN + µ4) ax+ θGby
The share of N is:
A
2
+ (θG + θN)
ax+ by
2
+
uNN − uNG
2
=
1
2
(θG + θN − µ4) ax+ θNby + A
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Once again, ex ante investments by each party will maximize the above
expression subject to the costs of the investments:
x˜N =
1
2
(θG + θN + µ4) a = 1
2
(1 + µ4) a
y˜N = θNb.
The expected total surplus is
S˜N = A+
1
2
a2δ (−µ4) + b2θN
(
1− θN
2
)
where δ (−µ4) = (1 + µ4) (1− 1
4
(1 + µ4)). Given the property of δ (.) we
have described above, δ (−µ4) is increasing in µ4 and ranges between 3
4
(when µ4 is the smallest at 0) and 1 (when µ4 = 1).
Suppose 4 > 0, i.e., θG > θN . Then it is straightforward to show that
θG >
1
2
(1 + µ4) and 1
2
(1− λ4) > θN . That is, ownership by G gives better
investment to both parties, irrespective of the relative importance of the
investments of the two parties or the extent of the hold-up problem under the
two different forms of single-ownership. The result is symmetric in the case
of 4 < 0; now one can show that θN > 12 (1− λ4) and 12 (1 + µ4) a > θG.
When 4 = 0, both forms of ownership yields the same expected surplus.
This gives us one of our key results:
Result 4 If a party values the project more, he should own it irrespective of
the relative importance of his investment or the degree of the hold-up problem
depending on who is the owner.
This is one of the key surprising result in Besley-Ghatak (2001): you
should make the person with the highest valuation the owner, even in the
extreme case where he does not invest. The key difference from the case
where the benefits from the project are private and appropriable is that
now, how much a party values the non-pecuniary benefits (which happen
to be non-excludable and non-rival as well) becomes an important factor in
determining who should own the project.
What is striking is, even if one party does not have any useful to invest-
ments to make (say, a = 0) that party may be optimally the owner which
can never happen in the standard GHM framework with private appropriable
returns. For example, when a = 0, x = 0 but y˜N < y˜G whenever θG > θN .
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The intuition is that being the owner means a party commits to completing
the project (as opposed to walking away) and given that the owner cares a
lot about the project return, the investing party can extract enough surplus
from him at the bargaining stage.
We now consider the case where the parties jointly own the project. In
the case of joint-ownership, the outside options are as before:
uJG = u
J
N = 0.
As a result, the investment levels will be:
x˜J =
1
2
(θG + θN) a =
1
2
a
y˜J =
1
2
(θG + θN) b =
1
2
b
The total expected surplus will be
S˜J = A+
1
2
(
3
4
a2 +
3
4
b2
)
.
As in the previous section, as δ (0) = 3
4
, this expression can also be written
as:
S˜J = A+
1
2
δ (0)
(
a2 + b2
)
.
As with the first-best, given our normalization of θG+θN = 1, the investment
levels and the expected social surplus is the same here as in the private
appropriable returns case. Now the relevant condition for comparing joint-
ownership with the two pure forms of single-ownership is:
δ (0)
(
a2 + b2
)
> max
{
a2θG (2− θG) + b2δ (λ4) , a2δ (−µ4) + b2θN (2− θN)
}
.
Comparing this with the expected surplus underG-ownership andN -ownership,
the following result follows directly:
Result 5 Public-private partnership can emerge as a preferred organiza-
tional form if the gap between θG and θN is relatively small and the hold-
up problem is significant under both forms of single ownership (λ and µ are
high).
21
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Consider the case where 4 > 0 so that G-ownership dominates N -
ownership. Then the investment in x is higher under G-ownership than
joint-ownership, as θG (2− θG) > 34 given that θG lies between 12 and 1.
Clearly, if λ = 0 then joint-ownership cannot dominate as the level of y is
the same under both forms of ownership. For higher values of λ the level of
investment in y is lower under G-ownership, going to 0 when λ4 = 1. For low
values of4 and high values of λ, joint-ownership can dominate G-ownership.
An analogous argument holds when 4 < 0 and µ ranges from low to high
values. The intuition is, joint-ownership equates the bargaining power of
both parties ex post. So if there is not that much of a difference between G
and N in terms of how much they value the results of the investment (or the
importance of their investment in generating value) and the hold-up problem
is non-trivial, it can dominate pure forms of ownership.
2.3 Extensions
Our core framework can be extended in a number of ways to relate to some
of facts and anecdotes about NGOs in developing countries. Here we briefly
discuss two extensions, both related to the value that the private actor we
refer to as N attaches to the services generated from the project. In the
framework above, we assumed that the benefit from the project is valued by
both parties, and that these benefits are non-rival and non-excludable. In
this subsection, we consider two extensions that relax this assumption. First,
we consider the case where the private provider is commercially motivated
and derives no non-pecuniary value from the service. Next, we consider the
case where both parties do derive non-pecuniary payoffs from the project but
because they have divergent preferences over the mission of the project (e.g.,
the syllabus in the case of a school).
In a lot of discussion of public-private partnerships, the private party is
assumed to be a for-profit firm (see, for example, Hart (2003) and Iossa and
Martimort (2015)) and the main focus is on the non-contractible dimensions
of the service, which often takes the form of a cost-quality trade-off. It is
reasonable to ask how our conclusions are affected when the private party is
a for-profit firm that is commercially motivated and derives no direct non-
pecuniary benefit from the service. In that case, θN = 0. However, to the
extent the government continues to value the service, its valuation is still
captured by θG > 0. In fact, given our assumption that θG + θN = 1, let us
assume θG = 1 in this case, to make the analysis comparable to the case where
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θN > 0. Notice that this case does not collapse to the case the project benefits
being a private good that we analyzed earlier, since we restrict ourselves to
the benefits being fully non-pecuniary. In this extension, the private party
simply does not put any value on the non-pecuniary benefit.
Suppose G is the owner and chooses the mission. We can simply replace
θN with 0 and θG = 1 in the expressions for x˜
G and y˜G, and S˜G in the
previous subsection to obtain:
x˜G = a
y˜G =
1
2
(1− λ) b.
For the case of N -ownership, the corresponding expressions are:
x˜N =
1
2
(1 + µ) a
y˜N = 0.
Similarly, setting θN = 0, the expressions for the investment levels in the
case of joint-ownership becomes:
x˜J =
1
2
a
y˜J =
1
2
b.
We can see immediately that N -ownership can never be preferred to
G-ownership since investment levels of both x and y are higher under G-
ownership. There is a trade-off between G-ownership and joint-ownership,
and in particular, if b is high (so investment incentives for y are important)
and λ is high (the scope for opportunism by G is high), joint-ownership can
become the most-preferred option. Using the same logic, we can also see
what happens in the case where G is non-caring (e.g., a non-democratic gov-
ernment) while N puts a lot of value on the project. By setting θG = 0 and
θN = 1, we can see that in this case N -ownership dominates G-ownership,
while the choice between N -ownership and joint-ownership depends on pa-
rameter values (in particular, high values a and/or.µ would tend to favour
joint-ownership).
Next we turn to the case of divergent mission-preferences, stemming pos-
sibly from different ideologies or putting different welfare weights on different
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social groups (see Besley and Ghatak, 2001, 2005, and 2017 for further dis-
cussion on mission preferences and how it affects organization design). A
simple way to introduce it would be to let the owner being able to dictate
the mission of the project. If G is the owner, and gets to pick the mission,
its payoff from the benefit of the project is θG while that of N is σθN with
σ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, and symmetrically, when N is the owner, and gets to
pick the mission, its payoff from the benefit of the project is θN while that of
G is σθG. When σ = 1 there is full alignment of mission-preferences, while
when σ = 0, the mission-preferences are completely divergent. Under joint-
ownership, we can think of G and N agreeing on a compromise mission, so
that G and N receive a payoff σˆθG and σˆθN with σˆ ≥ σ reflecting the fact
that a compromise mission is generally likely to be preferred by each party
to the other party having full control over choice of mission.
Suppose G is the owner and chooses the mission. We can simply replace
θN with σθN in the expressions for x˜
G and y˜G, and S˜G in the previous
subsection to obtain:
x˜G = θGa
y˜G =
1
2
{1− λ (θG − σθN)} b.
For the case of N -ownership, the corresponding expressions are:
x˜N =
1
2
{1 + µ (σθG − θN)} a
y˜N = θNb.
Similarly, replacing θG and θN with σˆθG and σˆθN , the expressions for the
investment levels in the case of join-ownership becomes:
x˜J =
1
2
σˆ (θG + θN) a =
1
2
σˆa
y˜J =
1
2
σˆ (θG + σθN) b =
1
2
σˆb.
If mission-preferences are very strong and there is little congruence, then
σ as well as σˆ will be close to zero. In that case, the public good nature of
the project effectively goes away. Now, it is no longer possible for a party
to be the owner even when the importance of its investment is minimal, so
long as it values the project benefit more. Not just that, the case for joint-
ownership disappears since the value derived by both parties are effectively
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taxed away by incompatibility in mission-preferences. The choice between
G and N ownership will now be determined by the relative importance of
a and b, as well as that of λ and µ, as in the private good case. Also, as
with the private good case, the comparative advantage of the two parties in
providing the respective investments may still leave the scope for partnership
open relative to autarchy.
3 Application to NGOs in Developing Coun-
tries
The theoretical framework developed above has a number of implications
regarding the choice of the mode of provision. Our goal in this section is to
try to relate the theoretical framework to a large number of descriptive case
studies and anecdotes in a structured way, even though we do not have the
data needed for formal testing.6
Implication 1 Partnerships are more likely when the government and the
NGO have comparative advantages in the respective tasks.
There is general agreement that NGO involvement in public projects in
developing countries has grown in response to budgetary stringency and fis-
cal austerity measures to achieve macroeconomic stabilization (Hulme and
Edwards, 1997). Since public sector employees enjoy higher wages and secu-
rity of employment compared to NGO workers, NGOs have a cost advantage.
This is reinforced by the possibility that NGOs attract workers and activists
who are dedicated to the cause and therefore willing to work for lower wages
and benefits (Robinson, 1997).
An additional factor is that decentralization initiatives have been associ-
ated with greater involvement of NGOs. For example, Fiszbein and Lowden
(1999) suggest that a large majority of public-private partnerships in Latin
America involve local governments that have tighter budget constraints and
are more limited in the scope of activities they are efficient at, are more
open to partnerships with NGOs. The expertise of NGOs in specific areas
such as targeting and ability to access the poorest groups, and experience
and technical knowledge in the fields of education, health, environment, and
6This section draws on some of the discussion reported in Besley and Ghatak (1999,
2001) as well as Ghatak (2005) but has been substantially revised and updated.
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more recently IT technology have been the main factors driving some of these
partnerships (Sansom 2011).7
Implication 2 Pure NGO provision will be more prevalent in projects where
: (i) the public sector is relatively less efficient in input provision (i.e.
a < b) and/or (ii) the NGO’s ability to provide the complementary
inputs is better than that of the government, namely, γG > γN .
In developing countries, NGOs typically work in environments where the
reach of the government is either weak or non-existent. After the Second
Intifada in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in September of 2000, NGOs
have been seen as invaluable in assuring the provision of emergency and relief
services to the Palestinian population living under the strict controls imposed
by Israel. The share of the NGO sector in service provision in Palestine
covered more than 60% of all health-care services, 80% of all rehabilitation
services, and almost 100% of all preschool education (Jarrar 2005). The same
is true of primary health and education in many African countries in remote
rural areas where non-profits run by Christian missionaries are often the only
service agencies operating (Bratton, 1989). Also in the field of micro-credit,
NGOs in Bangladesh have gained a large number of beneficiaries thanks to
their wider coverage encompassing remote areas where government agencies
are absent (Chowdhury 2013).
The scope of public-private partnership is circumscribed when the ability
of the government to be an effective partner is doubtful. According to an
interviewee with Medicines Sans Frontiers working in conflict-affected North
Darfur State of Sudan, most NGOs prefer to work in isolation. The reason is
that they feel that the government does not have the capacity and capability
in terms of qualified health staff and communication facilities to collaborate
effectively with them (Yagub 2014). Likewise, El Salvador and Jamaica’s
moves towards decentralization brought about local governments with criti-
cally restricted fiscal and service delivery capabilities. This resulted in the
growth of pure NGO provision. Moreover, Fiszbein and Lowden (1999) cite
7In the city of Itagui in Colombia the local government took care of construction of
school buildings and an NGO with a distinguished track record in providing education
undertook the responsibility of managing the curriculum and staff. In a pilot project in El
Salvador the Ministry of Health successfully delegated the management of health care to
an NGO while retaining the financing responsibility, mainly owing to the NGOs dedicated
and well trained volunteers and doctors travel to parts of the rural countryside that public
health services never was able to reach.
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various instances in Argentina where NGOs moved away from partnerships
with the central government due to the layers of bureaucracy which made
potential transactions costs a lot higher.
When NGOs focus on a small geographic area of action, they are likely
to be accomplished in tackling many different tasks of the project on their
own, even those where the government might naturally be thought to enjoy
a comparative advantage.8 For example, the local government may have a
comparative advantage in the provision of a health facility to a village where
an NGO is attempting to promote modern birth practices because it already
owns the local health clinic. Nonetheless, the NGO may be able to construct
the one facility on its own fairly efficiently. The high γN , therefore, renders
partnership with the government unnecessary and we see NGO provision of
public goods commonly. However, when it comes to expanding an effective
rural development program beyond a small area, NGOs often need collabora-
tions with the government as projects require investments which NGOs can
no longer do competently by themselves. In similar vein, the efficiency of an
NGO in creating health facilities in all villages is likely to lack the capacity
of government which can make use of existing clinics. Hence, full-scale pro-
vision by NGOs will tend to be rare. A good example to illustrate this is the
partnership between Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Ghana Health
Service (GHS) in the Upper East region of Ghana from 2009 to 2011 (see
Hushie, 2016). GHS supported the project with health facilities and person-
nel, while CRS trained traditional birth attendants and provided the logistics
and incentives to attract pregnant women to deliver in health centers.
Implication 3 NGO provision will be more prevalent in projects where the
NGO cares more about the beneficiaries.
Discussions about the role of NGOs frequently make reference to the
fact that their objectives are more in tune with the interests of the poor than
those of government. A case in point is Subbarao et al (1997) who argue that
“NGO delivery proved better than government delivery ... due to charis-
matic leadership and dedicated workers..” in the context of programs aimed
at poverty relief. A similar line of argument is taken by the United Nations
8The tremendous success in Paskistani NGOs in the arena of health care is attributed
to the fact that they can execute ideal projects serving one limited population in a spec-
ified geographic area. NGOs can promptly hire more staff (especially female health care
providers) at acceptable salaries and acquire specialized equipment (Ejaz et al 2011).
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Interagency Committee on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the
Pacific (1992) which claims that “the rural poor are given higher priority by
NGOs” (page 20). That said, Implication 1 above is also acknowledged in
recognizing that governments tend to have a comparative advantage on ac-
count of their “much greater resource and broader institutional framework”.
The importance of NGO motivation is also a theme in Bratton (1989)
and Clark (1995) who argue that successful government-NGO partnerships
reply on governments and NGOs having a commitment towards helping the
beneficiaries. In cases where the government lacks a commitment to poverty
alleviation, they argue that NGOs have preferred to stay free from direct
involvement with governments. On the flip side, countries where the govern-
ment has a clear commitment to a social agenda, has led to a flowering of
partnerships with NGOs as has occurred in countries like India, Sri Lanka,
as well as some countries in Latin American.9
This contrasts with the experience of some autocratic African govern-
ments which have lacked commitment to the poor where this has fostered a
climate in which (mostly church-based) NGOs unilaterally engaging in relief
and welfare work and providing health and education services. World De-
velopment Report (1997) noted that those governments that out-source to
private organizations such as NGOs tend to do so for the provision of social
services. However, they tend to prefer for-profit providers when it comes
to infrastructure provision. This is because it is hard to measure quality
of social service provision and the commitment to the interests of the poor
displayed by NGOs enhances the quality and outreach of provision.
But in contrast to this line of thought, there is a range of arguments
that NGOs are not as altruistic as is often claimed. For example, Fafchamps
and Owens (2009) use an instrumental variable approach with fixed effects
on a nationally representative sample of 300 NGOs in Uganda to conclude
that many local NGOs seem to be created simply to obtain grant funding.
They corroborate this argument with the observation that numerous Ugan-
dan NGOs have a shadowy existence - some three quarters of 1,700 NGOs
registered in Kampala could not be located - when they do not receive an
external grant. Grants do not appear to go to NGOs that would raise funds
on their own but rather to a few well-educated, well-connected organizations
and individuals skilled at writing grant applications. Consistent with this
9One could also argue that increased decentralization would lead to more partnerships
because local governments are more responsive to local needs.
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idea, Chowdhury (2013) find that female Bangladeshi beneficiaries of micro-
credit rate NGOs slightly lower than government organizations in terms of
‘Attention of the service provider towards your welfare’. They believe that
NGOs’ prime intention is in gaining their own financial sustainability, with
little concern over maximizing the welfare benefits of the beneficiaries.
Implication 4 Partnerships will be more likely when NGO and government
mission preferences are more congruent.
There is evidence that governments tend to avoid partnerships with some
kinds of NGOs with overt ideological preferences. This is argued, for example,
in Farrington and Lewis (1993) who suggests that partnerships are more likely
to form in areas where the activity does not lend itself to ideological stances
such as in the case of relief and welfare services, and core areas of development
such as the delivery of inputs, the provision/adoption of technology and
adapting technology to suit local conditions. The main conflicts appear to
arise for NGOs which are engaged predominantly in some forms of advocacy
such as promoting land reform, encouraging protection of the environment,
bargaining for increased wages, recognition of legal rights, particularly civil
and political rights.
The case of the Hindu nationalist BJP government in the Indian state of
Gujarat also illustrates Implication 4. The government has been in constant
conflict with Christian missionaries who operate schools and hospitals with
frequent accusations that they are used as a tool for converting tribal and
low caste Hindus to Christianity. This view is reinforced by Sen (1998)
who conducted a survey of NGOs in India and noted that both parties with
strong ideological dispositions (left and right) are less willing to collaborate
with NGOs. However, there appears to be an exception charitable or relief
work where, arguably, there is less room for divergent views. This contrasts
with the case of governments dominated by more centrist parties which have
a much broader range of collaborations with NGOs.
These anecdotes and findings resonate with a more recent interview of an
official from the Sudanese Ministry of Health by Yagub (2014). The intervie-
wee stated that governments are wary of collaboration with NGOs because
they believe the NGOs have hidden political agendas that serve their coun-
tries of origin, especially most international NGOs from Western countries
with which the government differs politically and ideologically. This mistrust
has triggered an expulsion of 13 NGOs by the government from conflict-
ridden Darfur in early March 2009 (Wakabi 2009). Further reinforcing the
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importance of congruent objectives, is the observation that NGO involve-
ment in projects is prevalent in famine or disaster relief where governments
and NGOs share similar goals. Pritchett and Variengo (2015) discuss where
private schooling has become acceptable around the world and, in line with
the argument developed here, that this in places where NGOs do not get
involved in providing education is where the lack of verifiability of social-
ization and instruction of beliefs, which makes third party contracting for
socialization problematic.
Case studies of collaborative efforts between NGOs and government rein-
force the view that comparative advantage of NGOs in reaching beneficiaries
is an important reason for such partnerships to emerge. That said, serv-
ing only as the delivery agent of government or being dependent on public
funding necessitates some NGOs moderating their ideological or religious dis-
positions. (Clark, 1995 and Farrington and Lewis, 1993). This observation is
consistent with our theoretical finding that NGOs will tend to supply higher
levels of y only if they also control the design of the project.
Implication 5 The NGO will own assets related to the project if : (i) it is
the more efficient provider (i.e. a < b) and/or (ii) its assets are not
highly specific (λ is high).
This implication is illustrated by the provision of agricultural extension
services in Bolivia where the government retained responsibility for R&D
while NGOs built an extension system to serve farmers. Farrington and
Bebbington (1993) note in this context that
“careful planning of responsibilities (between NGOs and govern-
ments) is particularly important in fully collaborative efforts –
such as joint on-farm trials — in which a successful outcome re-
quires on carefully scheduled inputs from both sides” (pp.153).
The kind of partnership that emerged in Bolivia is predicted by our model
if the provision of an extension service involves assets that highly specific so
that the hold-up problem is potentially very severe.
Another Bolivian example is where, in the 1990s, the state contracted
out the management of public schools to a local church organization along
with the right to appoint principals and teachers. This program proved so
successful was so successful that it was proposed as a potential model for
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national reform (see World Development Report, 1997). In terms of our
framework, this example could be interpreted this as a partnership with G-
ownership since the NGO does actually not own schools. This arrangement
would follow from our model if the teachers who where hired by NGOs were
not a very specific asset to NGO management and/or if the NGO would not
fulfill many of the other functions undertaken by governments efficiently.
Another example from India is where governments have increasingly rec-
ognized the expertise of NGOs in the health area alongside the failure of its
own agencies. This has led to government asking NGOs to run its primary
health centers overturning an earlier policy which involved giving subsidies
and tax advantages to NGOs (see Duggal, 1988). These changes can be
interpreted in terms of our theoretical framework as a move from pure gov-
ernment provision to an N -ownership mode of provision in response to an
appreciation of the higher commitment of NGOs (high θN) and a recognition
that the large number of NGOs improves their replaceability (λ high).
To summarize, this section has suggested that the model put forward
here can be useful in interpreting some of the policy experience and under-
standing developments that have occurred in building partnerships between
government and NGOs. Although each application is specific, it is useful
to have a guiding conceptual apparatus when exploring specific studies even
when the model is quite simple. A range of factors suggested by the model
do seem to have surfaced in practical discussions.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a theoretical framework, building on Besley and Ghatak
(2001), that is useful for considering how the state and the voluntary sector
interact in delivering public projects. A core assumption is that contracts
between the state and providers are incomplete. This results in a hold-up
problem, with ownership determining bargaining power in the event of any
dispute ex post and thereby affecting ex ante investment incentives. This
in turn generates a theory of who should own and provide inputs, as in
the now extensive property rights literature originating from Grossman and
Hart (1986). We show that in the context of public goods and services, this
depends not only on the comparative advantage in providing inputs but also
the way that each party values the output as in Besley and Ghatak (2001),
departing from the cost-quality trade-off that the literature on public-private
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partnerships has largely focused on.
The well-known Lindahl-Samuelson principle of public goods provision
suggests that if citizens find some way to overcome the free-rider problem,
we should observe partnerships almost everywhere as citizens use voluntary-
ism to express their willingness to pay. However, the analysis shows why
this is not sufficient for partnerships to emerge with concerned voluntary
organizations when there are limits to contracting possibilities. While the
model does deliver the presumption that “caring matters” in the assignment
of responsibility for provision, there are significant caveats to this. Examples
include cases where hold up problems are severe and when the private sector
and/or government have ideological differences germane to project design.
The analysis in this paper opens up the possibility of a wider research pro-
gram integrating our understanding of contracting frictions with the study
of state capacity. Besley and Persson (2011, 2014) emphasize that state ca-
pacities require investments which underpin state effectiveness in taxation,
provision of legal services and public spending. The model developed above
suggests that understanding such investments should sit alongside an under-
standing of the effectiveness of private action in delivering services and/or
in supporting government provision. It also underlines the role of govern-
ment objectives in affecting the form that such investments will take which
links back to the institutional environment affecting government objectives.
Opening this black box should therefore be useful in pushing forward debates
about how to build effective public service delivery in a range of contexts and
how the role of the state and private action sit together.
The framework put forward here is useful in interpreting some case study
evidence reflecting the role of NGOs, an area in which practical progress has
proceeded apace in the real world with limited discussion of the underlying
first principles. Our discussion reveals of the utility of the framework in
understanding the kinds of issues that have arisen in practice. It is clear, for
example, that problems of hold-up and asset ownership, comparative advan-
tage and ideological compatibility, as argued by the theoretical framework,
are indeed important factors in shaping partnerships. This provides some
encouragement to a research agenda which matches theoretical models to
practical experience in this area, and for empirical work to assess the rela-
tive importance of the various trade-offs and how they depend on some key
parameters of the environment as identified by the theory.
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